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I. Introduction
Labor receives pecuniary and nonpecuniary (life insurance, health benefits, pension coverage, and other agreed-upon benefits) compensation from employers. Four recent empirical studies have examined the variation of union-nonunion differentials focusing on wages (Podgursky, 1986) (Lester, 1967; Woodbury, 1983) . Second, prekious studies focusing on either wages or benefits in isolation are necessarily incomplete. A worker accepts hidher current job offer based on both the wage-benefits mix of total conipet~sation and the total compensation comprising both ccumpunents. In effect, the patterns of union-nonunion total compensation and benefitsto-wages mix differentials are lkely to differ across plant sizes when compared to wages or henetits differentials in isolation. Moreover, a simultaneous consideration of wage and nonpecuniary compensations allows an assessment of whether the declining union-nonunion pattern of differentials observed for wages (Podgursky, 1986) , total benefits (Freeman, 1986; Freeman and Medoff, 1984) , and health coverage (BWR) across plant sizes or the U-shaped pattern of union-nonunion differentials (as observed by BWR for pension coverage) across plant sizes is preserved for total compensation. Thus. we frwmally extend the recent works of Podgursky and BWR by investigating the structure of union-nonunion total compensation (wage and nonwage --focusing on pension, health coverage, holidays, and vacations) differentials across establishment sizes.
The data chosen fnr this study come from the May 1983 CPS. With this data we ;ire able to identify establishment size for the workers. Unfortunately health and pension benefits are reported only as present or absent. In order to circumvent this problem we in~plement a procedure suggested by Mellow (1982) fcir separately imputing dollar values for health insurance and pension coverage benefits of workers who claitn participation in these benefits and Ross's (1 989) imputations for holidays and vacations. Each worker's pecuniary wage is then augmented with the imputed nonwage benefits to derive the worker's estimated total hourly compensation.
Union-nonunion @ecuniary, nonpecuniary, or total) compensation differentials across employer sizes cat1 be explained hy alternative theories such as: union threat effects (Podgursky, 1986) , cfficiet~cy wages (Lindheck and Snower, 1987) , and the wage dispersion effects of unions (Freeman and Medoff, 193 2). Adhcrcnts to the union threat cffects thcory con tend that large non-unionized firms pay workers highcr wages to ward off the threat of potential unionization. Efficiency wage theory implies that both union and non-union employees in large plants will rcceive higher wages beacuse of large monitoring costs. The wage premiums paid to non-union workers in larger plants could decrease the extent of thc unionnonunion differential. The wagc disprrsicln effects of unions presupposes the existence of a binding upper limit constraint on the wage for a particular job. This assumption guarantees that the ability of a newly unionized firm to obtain large wage increase for its workers is inversely related tu the firm size. If employees of a small nun-union firm receive wages far from the maximum possible wage for a particular jnh, they have the most to gain from unionization.
Data and methodology
The data arc for full-time, white, male workers employed by the private non-agricultural sector from the May 1983 Current Population Survey (CPS). Compensation includes the hourly wagc (HW) and four nonpccuniary fringe benefits: a worker's participation in pension or health insurance at hidher present job, holidays and vacations.? Since no data are available on holiday& or vacalions in the CPS, we have adopted Ross's (1989) assumption that all workers receive holidays, and workers with more than one year ol' tenure receive vacations. Since responses on individual worker's participation or non-participntion in pension and health benefit plans arc recorded on an ordinal ("Yes" or "No") wage (HW) as the dependent variable. As expected. workers with higher education, experience, and tenure are paid significantiy higher compensation. Also. workers in larger establishments receive higher compensation. There is very little difference between the total compensation and hourly wage estimates. Now we turn our attention to the unionnonunion differentials. The mlinn-nonunion differential is significant in the three smallest establishment sizes (under 500 employees) and insignificant in the largest two establishment sizes. Thjs is true in both the total compensation and hourly wagc specifications. The significant coeficients on the union dummies are only slightly larger in the total compensation equation than in the hourly wage equation. Thc pattern of union-nonunion differentials observed by Podgursky (1 98 6) far wages and BWR (1989) for health benefits exists in both our total cornpensatinn and hourly wage spedficatiuns. The union-nonunion differential in wages and total compensation steadily declines from over 30 percent 111 establishments with fewer than 25 employees, to close to zero in estahlishments with over 500 employees. Table I1 presents a summary of union-nonunion compensatiodwage differentials across plant sizes based on the estimates presented in Table I . Tests were conducted to determine if the union-nonunion differentials varied across establishment sizes. These results indicate that the union-nonunion differentials in the smallest two establishment sizes are significantly different from each other, as are the union-nonunion differentials in Size 2 and Size 3 establishments. The final row of Table I1 indicates that we can quite strongly reject the null hypothesis that the union-nonunion differentials are identical across all establishment sizes. In other words. Podgursky's results that unionnonunion wage differentials decline over plant sizes still holds even when pension. health benefits, holidays, and vacations are incorpr>ratcd into the compensation structure. Our finding of an inverse relationship between union-nonunion total We have made exlensive use of the imputation suggestiuns given by Ross (1989). Ross in his Chapter 3 provides econometric proofs supporting the asymptotic cnnsistzncy of thc OLS e\tiinatcs when individual worker's norl-wage benefits expenditure are imputed from esIablishment data.
We'd like rrl thar~k thc rcfcrcc For bringing this dissertation to our aitcntiiin Thc U.S. Chamber of Cummerce publication Employec Benefits (varicus issue<) revcals that for hourly workcrs the percent of compcnsatiun that was made towards health insurnnce and pensiun plans rernnincd virtually unchanged between 1477 and 1984 (9.3 vs. 9 .9 percent of wagcs for all industries and 9.4 vs. 9.9 percent in manufacturing).
